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Robert L. Youngblood, II, Plaintiff-Respondent-Appellee, through his 
legal counsel, submits this Brief in Response to the Brief of Auto-Owners 
Insurance Company, Defendant-Petitioner-Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2(3)(a) and (5). 
STATEMENT OI: ISSUE PRESENTED FOR Rt IEW 
The only issue before this Court, pursuant to its Order dated June 16, 
2005, is the following: 
Whether equitable estoppel may apply to modify the scope of ai i 
insurance policy's coverage where the scope of coverage is 
misstated by a company agent prior to the insured's purchase of the 
policy.1 
1
 Auto-Owners appears, in its Brief, to have gone far afield from the issue laid 
out by this Court in its Order of June 16, 2005. Mr. Youngblood will 
nonetheless seek to limit his Brief to that issue and will, accordingly, not utilize 
this Court's resources in responding to factual and legal contentions set forth 
in Auto-Owners' Brief that are extraneous to that issue. 
Also, Mr. Youngblood's counsel apologizes to the Court for inadvertently 
ignoring that part of the Court's said Order that suspended the operation of 
Rule 26(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and for causing a Rule 
26(a) Stipulation for extension of time to be filed on August 29, 2005. This 
Brief is being submitted within the time set by the Rules and as though that 
Stipulation had not been executed and filed. 
1 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The appropriate standard of review appears to be one purely of law, with 
this Court according no deference to the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, which implicitly answered the above-quoted issue under review by 
this Court in the affirmative. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Given the sole issue the Court has asked the parties to address, the 
"Statement of the Case" can be appropriately distilled to the following: 
1. On or about December 30,1997 Mr. Youngblood was a 
pedestrian, walking across a parking lot toward a medical office, when he was 
struck by an automobile driven by one Rachel Louise Cooksey ("the 
tortfeasor"). R. 43; 50-51. 
2. The tortfeasor had $50,000 in available liability insurance. R. 45; 
56. 
3. Mr. Youngblood settled with the tortfeasor for her policy limits. R. 
45; 56. 
4. Mr. Youngblood has alleged that his damages, for injuries 
sustained as results of the tortfeasor's vehicle's striking him, exceed the 
$50,000 that was paid by the tortfeasor's insurance carrier. R. 45; 56-57. 
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I1 The subject Auto-Owners policy includes a limit of $300 ()()() in 
u.i.m. coverage R. 45. 
•:. Mr. Youngblood was, at all times material hereto, the president 
and sole owner of Youngblood Home Improvement, Inc., the first-named 
insured urvJpr the subject Auto-Owners policy R 64; 77-94; 104. 
7. Prior to settling his claim against the tortfeasor for the $50,000 
liability policy limits, Mr. Youngblood, through his counsel, communicated with 
Auto Owner , leqardim.) his intent ID settle that i lairn for those limits nn tin 
condition that that settlement would not jeopardize his entitlement to u.i.m. 
benefits under the subject Auto-Owners policy. R. 64; 107. 
M Mr Voungblood relied, tirsl in purchasing the subject policy of 
insurance, and second in settling his claim against the tortfeasor, on 
representations of Auto-Owners' agents that the Auto-Owners policy provided 
him, personally, u.i.ni coverage, fur riulu-pedestiian accidents ifirst generally, 
and then for the subject accident in particular). R. 65-66; 76; 95-105. 
9. Mr. Youngblood was not informed that u.i.m. benefits would not be 
available to him because this was a corporate policy trom whose u i ni 
coverage he could not as an injured pedestrian personally benefit. R. 66; 107; 
104-05. 
3 
10. Mr. Youngblood, in reliance on the said representations of Auto-
Owners' agents, did not read the policy language that provides u.i.m. coverage 
to a pedestrian only if he is the first-named insured in the policy. R. 104-05. 
11. The Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County (Honorable 
William B. Bohling) rejected Mr. Youngblood's contention that Auto-Owners 
should, by virtue of its agent's statement that underinsured motorist benefits 
would be available to Mr. Youngblood in the event of an auto-pedestrian 
collision in which he was injured and Mr. Youngblood's reasonable reliance on 
that statement, be equitably estopped to deny coverage to him and, 
accordingly, granted Auto-Owners' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
12. A unanimous panel of the Utah Court of Appeals, determining that 
Mr. Youngblood must be allowed to pursue his equitable estoppel claim, 
reversed the District Court's grant of Summary Judgment. 
13. This Court, by its Order of June 16, 2005, granted Auto-Owners' 
Petition for Certiorari and framed the issue as quoted at page 1, above. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Based on sound legal principles and important public policy 
considerations, equitable estoppel may apply to modify the scope of an 
insurance policy's coverage where the scope of coverage is misstated by a 
company agent prior to an insured's purchase of the policy. 
4 
ARGUMENT 
THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISION 
AND ALLOW MR. YOUNGBLOOD TO PRESENT HIS CASE TO A JURY. 
This case deals with the bedrock legal concept that insurance 
companies, like other entities, should be held to honor the oral representations 
of their agents on which people such as Mr. Youngblood reasonably rely. The 
Court of Appeals decision is not contrary to any decision of this Court. None 
of this Court's cases relied on by Auto-Owners for its contention that the Court 
of Appeals decision is in conflict with this Court's decisional Jaw deals with 
considerations of estoppel or with affirmative misrepresentations by insurance 
company saiespeople. This Court's cases so cited by Auto-Owners «Jeal with 
questions of whether ambiguities exist in insurance contracts and with parol 
evidence considerations. Mr. Youngblood has never contended that the policy 
language at issue is ambiguous. Nor has he for the purpose of contract 
interpretation ever sought to inject parol evidence into this case. This Court 
should affirm the Court of Appeals decision and thereby uphold the basic and 
appropriate proposition that, in limited circumstances (see Court of Appeals 
decision at fl 27), insurance companies may be estopped to deny the 
affirmative representations of their agentsH 
5 
This Court has, in cases such as Ellerbeck v. Continental Casualty Co.. 
227 P. 805, 8082 (Utah 1924) made clear the public policy of this State to hold 
insurance companies to the promises of their agents. 
This Court has, in a different legal context, explained that 
'Public policy' is the label we attach to those shared expectations and 
standards of conduct which have acquired both widespread and deeply 
held allegiance among the citizenry generally. 
Hansen v. America Online, Inc.. 2004 UT 62, fl 12. 
This Court has stated, also in a different legal context: 
[The] principle of law [that one induced to make a contract by false 
representations can be relieved from the burden thereof by a court in 
equity] has been usually recognized by all courts and textwriters, and we 
do not feel disposed to depart from a rule founded, as it is. upon 
ordinary common honesty. 
Berkeley Bank for Co-ops v. Meibos. 607 P.2d 798, 804 (Utah 1980) 
(emphasis added). 
There is, when those fundamental concepts are understood, nothing 
remarkable or out of the ordinary about the Court of Appeals decision, one that 
simply fosters honesty and fair dealing (things that surely have — in the words 
of this Court in Hansen -- "acquired both widespread and deeply held 
2
 "The principle that no one shall be permitted to deny that he intended the 
natural consequences of his acts when he has induced others to rely upon 
them is as applicable to insurance companies as it is to individuals .... This 
principle is one of sound morals ... and its enforcement tends to uphold good 
faith and fair dealing." (Emphasis added.) 
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allegiance among the citizenry generally"). 
Auto-Owners appears to be suggesting that this Court should determine 
that, as a matter of law, Mr. Youngblood's reliance on the agent's pre-policy-
purchase representations was unreasonable, given his failure to read the 
subject policy language.3 This Court should, in this connection, consider the 
observations of the Court of Appeals in Conder v. A.L. Williams & Assoc, 739 
P.2d 634 (Utah App. 1987), particularly the statements that "[reasonable 
reliance must be considered with reference to the facts of each case, and is 
usually a question for the jury to determine" and "[gjenerally, a plaintiff may 
justifiably rely on positive assertions of fact fsuch as the instant statements by 
the Auto-Owners agent] without independent investigation" (emphasis added), 
and 
It is only where, under the circumstances, the facts should make it 
apparent to one of his knowledge and intelligence, or he has discovered 
something which should serve as a warning that he is being deceived, 
that a plaintiff is required to make his own investigation. 
Id. at 638-39. 
3
 It may be significant that, although the policy language in question, dealing 
with coverage for pedestrians, is not, strictly speaking, ambiguous, it is, as the 
Court of Appeals noted, in its decision at n. 4: 
confusing and does not make clear that Youngblood would not be 
covered in an accident because the Policy was purchased in the 
company name rather than his own. 
7 
Also, and also contrary to Auto-Owners' contention, there is no conflict 
between the Court of Appeals decision in this case and its decision in Perkins 
v. Great West Life Assurance Company. 814 P.2d 1125 (Utah App. 1991). As 
explained in the Court of Appeals decision at ffij 12-14, the facts in Perkins are 
decidedly different from the facts in this case. Most importantly, in Perkins, 
there were no representations made by an insurance policy salesperson on 
which the plaintiff relied. The only misrepresentations in Perkins were made 
by the plaintiff's decedent. 814 P.2d at 1130. At the heart of the Court of 
Appeals decision in this case is that an Auto-Owners agent made specific pre-
policy purchase representations on which, as a matter of triable fact, 
Mr. Youngblood reasonably relied in purchasing the subject policy. 
The Court needs to consider the proposition, advanced by Auto-Owners 
and apparently accepted by the District Court, that insurance companies can 
never be estopped to deny coverage, regardless of statements of their agents, 
simply because those statements are at odds with the contents of insurance 
policies. Mr. Youngblood, a person who is not particularly sophisticated with 
respect to the contents of insurance policies in general, or with respect to his 
own policies in particular, is certainly not unique in his reliance on what his 
insurance company representative told him. 
8 
If Auto-Owners is correct in its analysis and if the rule of Perkins is to be 
applied as broadly as Auto-Owners has argued it should be, people even less 
sophisticated than Mr. Youngblood, and even the mentally infirm, will be held 
to have no estoppel remedy, even in cases of the most egregious 
misrepresentations, if they, in reliance on pro-coverage misrepresentations by 
sloppy or unscrupulous insurance company representatives, do not read the 
language of their policies. Mr. Youngblood submits that that should not and 
cannot be the law. 
Nor should the fact that some jurisdictions reject the contention that 
insurance companies may be estopped to deny the effect of oral 
representations of their agents cause this Court to determine that that is a rule 
of law that this Court should adopt. The better-reasoned decisions and those 
more in tune with extant law of this Court and sound public policy agree with 
the position espoused by Mr. Youngblood. 
This Court would be hard-pressed to find, in any survey it might conduct 
of the holdings and observations of courts of other jurisdictions, statements 
better fitting the law and policy of this State than those of the New Jersey 
Supreme Court, in Harr v. Allstate Insurance Co., 255 A.2d 208 (N.J. 1969), 
9 
discussed in the Court of Appeals decision at fl 18. The Harr court noted that 
it was impressed by decisions4 that proceeded 
on the thesis that where an insurer or its agent misrepresents, even 
though innocently, the coverage of an insurance contract, or the 
exclusions therefrom, to an insured before or at the inception of the 
contract, and the insured reasonably relies thereupon to his ultimate 
detriment, the insurer is estopped to deny coverage after a loss on a risk 
or from a peril actually not covered by the terms of the policy. 
Id. at 219. The Harr court also stated that "the fabove statedl proposition is 
one of elementary and simple justice" (emphasis added), and "by justifiably 
relying on the insurer's superior knowledge, the insured has been prevented 
from procuring the desired coverage elsewhere," and "To reject this approach 
because a new contract is thereby made for the parties would be an 
unfortunate triumph of form over substance." Id. That the facts in Harr differ 
4
 Those decisions mentioned by the Harr court are the following: Golden Gate 
Motor Transport Co. v. Great American Indemnity Co.. 6 Cal. 2d 439, 58 P.2d 
374 (1936); Ivev v. United National Indemnity Company. 259 F.2d 205 (9th Cir. 
1958) (applying California law); American Surety Co. of New York v. Heise. 
136 Cal. App. 2d 689, 289 P.2d 103 (Dist. Ct. App. 1955); Beach v. United 
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co.. 205 Cal. App. 2d 409, 23 Cal. Rptr. 73 (Dist. 
Ct. App. 1962); Modica v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Company. 236 Cal. 
App. 2d 588, 46 Cal. Rptr. 158 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); Mutual Benefit Life 
Insurance Co. v. Bailey. 55 Del. (5 Storey) 215, 190 A.2d 757 (1963); United 
Pacific Insurance Co. v. Meyer. 305 F.2d 107 (9th Cir. 1962) (applying Idaho 
law); Preferred Risk Mutual Insurance Co. v. Thomas. 372 F.2d 227 (4th Cir. 
1967) (applying South Carolina law); Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance 
Co. v. Bechard. 80 S.D. 237, 122 N.W. 2d 86,1 A.L.R.3d 1124 (1963); State 
Automobile Casualty Underwriters v. Ruotsalainen. 81 S.D. 472,136 N.W.2d 
884 (1965); Dodge v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.. Vt., 250 A.2d 742 (1969). 
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somewhat from the facts in this case should not, especially in light of the issue 
as framed by this Court's Order of June 16, 2005, be viewed by this Court as 
undercutting the significance of the Harr court's holding and eloquent 
observations. 
This Court should also consider the following passage from American 
Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jefferv. 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12225 (S.D. Ind. 2000). 
There the federal district court, in the course of denying the insurance 
company's motion for summary judgment in that coverage dispute, explained: 
Indiana courts have recognized that an insurer may be equitably 
estopped from denying coverage when the insurer's agent makes oral 
misrepresentations regarding the coverage provided by the policy and 
the purchaser reasonably relies on such misrepresentations. The 
Indiana Court of Appeals discussed the application of equitable estoppel 
under such circumstances in Village Furniture v. Associated Ins-
Managers. Inc.. 541 N.E.2d 306 (Ind. App. 1989). In that case, an 
insured furniture company brought an action to determine whether its 
insurance policy provided coverage for losses due to a fire at its 
furniture store. The insurer had denied coverage based on a "sprinkler 
clause," which precluded coverage for fire damage when an insured had 
turned off its sprinkler system. The insured's representatives admitted 
that they had never read the insurance policy. They claimed, however, 
that they had informed the insurer's agent about the company's previous 
problems with the sprinkler system freezing during cold weather and that 
the company was procuring insurance because of this problem. The 
parties agreed that the agent had never mentioned the sprinkler cause 
to the company representatives. Id. at 307. 
The trial court granted summary judgment to the insurer, finding that the 
insured had a duty to read the insurance policy and "to inform itself 
about its contract of insurance." Id. at 308. The Indiana Court of 
Appeals reversed. The court recognized that, although an insured 
generally has a duty to read his insurance policy, an exception exists 
11 
when an insurance company has "led the insured to believe that the 
specific coverage he had requested had been provided." Id. The court 
then quoted a Seventh Circuit case with approval: It is true that courts 
in Indiana and elsewhere, realizing that many people do not read their 
insurance policies and, perhaps even more important, do not do so 
because the policies are unreadable, have held that the agent's oral 
representations at the time of sale can override the written terms of the 
policy. If the agent insists to the prospective purchaser that the policy 
will insure against a hazard ... that the prospect is particularly 
concerned about, and the hazard materializes, the company may be 
estopped to plead the terms of the policy because the strength of the 
agent's oral assurances lulled the prospect into not reading, or reading 
inattentively, dense and rebarbative policy language. 
Id. Emphasis in original, quoting Burns v. Rockford Life Ins. Co.. 740 
F.2d 542, 544 (7th Cir. 1984) (internal citations omitted). The Indiana 
court then concluded that a question of fact remained as to whether the 
insured reasonably relied on the insurance agent's representations. 
In applying the doctrine of equitable estoppel to insurance coverage 
disputes, Indiana courts recognize an exception to the longstanding 
common law rule that a purchaser has a duty to read and understand 
the terms of his insurance policy. See Anderson Mattress Co. v. First 
State Ins.. 617 N.E.2d 932, 940 (Ind. App. 1993) (noting that, although 
older cases imposed an 'almost unconditional duty on the purchaser of a 
policy to acquaint himself with its contents and to understand them,' 
more recent cases have 'recognized exceptions to the rule'); accord, 
Plohg v. N.N. Investors Life Ins. Co.. 583 N.E.2d 1233, 1237 (Ind. App. 
1992) (The traditional rule has been that reliance is not justified where 
the injured party has a written instrument available and fails or neglects 
to read it. On the other hand, we have come to recognize that in the 
modern world ordinary, i.e., reasonable, care does not necessarily 
require a person to read something as complex as today's insurance 
policies.') (internal citation omitted); Medtech Corp. v. Indiana Ins. Co.. 
555 N.E.2d 844, 849-50 (Ind. App. 1990) (noting that, although insured 
generally has a duty to learn the terms of her insurance policy, there are 
'certain exceptions to this duty' including 'reasonable reliance upon an 
agent's representations'). 
12 
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12556, *10-*14 (some emphasis added). 
The analyses of the American Family case and the Indiana state court 
cases discussed in American Family seem to fit the facts here better than does 
the Court of Appeals' analysis in Perkins. And those cases seem to be 
attuned, whereas the Perkins decision does not, to this Court's Ellerbeck 
observation quoted hereinabove at n. 2 (p. 6). See, also, Scarborough v. 
Dependable Ins. Co.. 1993 Tenn. App. LEXIS 219, *2-*4; Kramer v. United 
Services Auto Ass'n, 436 So.2d 935, 936-67 (Fla. App. 1983). 
CONCLUSION AND STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
The Court should ask itself whether it is good public policy that an 
insurance company be allowed to affirmatively misrepresent facts regarding 
coverage with impunity and then do a "King's X" based on language in an 
insurance policy that is unlikely that the average lay person would even read. 
This Court's reinstating the District Court's ruling summarily dismissing 
Mr. Youngblood's claim would work injustice not only to Mr. Youngblood but 
also to other victims of overzealous, careless, and/or unscrupulous insurance 
company salespeople and insurance company adjusters who fail to acquaint 
themselves with and/or for other reasons fail accurately to represent the 
particulars of their companies' policies' coverage provisions. 
13 
It should be, as the Court of Appeals decision recognized, for a jury to 
determine, based on all the circumstances, whether Mr. Youngblood's reliance 
on the representations of Auto-Owners' agent was reasonable. And this Court 
should reject Auto-Owners' suggestion that the testimony of someone in 
Mr. Youngblood's position is insufficient evidence to carry a case to a jury. 
The law should not assume that someone in Mr. Youngblood's position would 
commit perjury for potential monetary gain. 
Based on the foregoing discussion and analysis, Mr. Youngblood urges 
this Court to answer the question set forth in its June 16, 2005 Order in the 
affirmative, to affirm the Court of Appeals decision, and to allow 
Mr. Youngblood to present his case to a jury. 
Respectfully submitted this «=> day of September, 2005. 
PETER C. COLLINS 
PETER C. COLLINS, L.L.C. 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant 
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